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Abstract 
The last 10 years has seen the development and deployment of new biotechnologies 
not just as potential treatments but also as potential enhancements. The definition and 
differentiation of treatment (therapy) from enhancement is an ongoing clinical, ethical 
and social debate that ranges across a proliferating number of convergent 
technologies. Many of these innovations will ‘come-on-line’ as present generations of 
young people will be reaching adulthood and considering parenthood. This paper 
reports on a project that explored the possibilities for human enhancement with young 
people in order to gather their attitudes towards enhancement and the types of 
arguments/reasoning they employ when thinking about the possibilities and the 
techniques. The project focused on if/how distinctions are made between treatment 
and enhancement, between the different techniques that might be used for 
enhancement (genetic and non-genetic) and perceptions of risks and benefits. The 
young people’s viewpoints, their methods of reasoning and underlying values are 
compared with those of bioethicists writing on the topic.  
Introduction 
The debate about whether a distinction can and should be drawn between the 
treatment and enhancement of human beings has become more pressing with the 
completion of the Human Genome Project and other convergent technologies, 
especially those within neuroscience. The distinction is, of course, relevant to debates 
about ethics and governance if it is assumed that treatment is unproblematic or less 
problematic, whereas anything defined as enhancement has to be carefully considered. 
However, gene therapy, stem cells therapy and neuroscientific technologies remain 
controversial, despite their potential to treat serious disease or disability, partly 
because they also have this potential to be used for enhancement.  
 
Bioethicists divide into those who find the distinction between treatment and 
enhancement untenable and support the use of biotechnology for both,2 and, those 
who argue that, although enhancement and treatment are difficult to distinguish, a 
distinction should be sought and any use of biotechnology for enhancement should be 
very carefully considered and regulated.3 However, the boundaries of medicine 
change over time.4 
 
Those who are pro-enhancement tend to argue first of all that there is no clear line to 
be drawn between treatment and enhancement, which makes efforts at regulation 
extremely difficult. All those who support enhancement have to deal with the 20th 
century Western history of previous attempts to improve the human race through 
eugenic programmes, most notoriously (but not, of course, confined to) in Nazi 
Germany. They argue that a clear separation can be made between old-style 
paternalistic state-enforced eugenics and eugenics based on individual parental 
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choice. The debate then becomes one about the freedom of individuals and families to 
choose. Agar goes so far as to argue that enhancement should operate on market 
principles; those who have the money and want to pay for the product should be free 
to do so5. While concerns are raised about ‘designer babies’ the counter argument is 
that it is unethical not to seek to improve on nature and ‘make the best babies you 
can.’6 Savulescu coined the term ‘procreative beneficence’ to indicate the moral duty 
on parents to select the best baby they can by IVF and preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis and, with other bioethicists, argues that parents should be trusted to choose 
for their children.7 The whole idea of enhancement is hardly new; parents have 
always tried to enhance their (potential) children, whether through their choice of 
‘mate’ or, postnatally, through their purchase of private schooling, music lessons or 
educational holidays.8 We might argue about the fairness of the ‘freedom to choose’ 
but we accept these inequalities as part of parental choice and the right to a privat
family life. Those who are pro-enhancement argue that in time new ways of 
enhancement will probably become more accessible, just as older types of 
enhancement, including education, have done. Furthermore new forms of 
enhancement may seem strange and even wrong now but will become accepted
time in the sam
e 
 over 
e way as other technologies.  
 
On the other hand, those who are critical of the application of enhancement 
technologies argue that we can and should draw a clear line between enhancement 
and treatment and that harms can result for individuals and society even if 
treatments/enhancements are chosen by individuals rather than being forced upon 
them. They point to a prospect of genetic inequalities that may be harder to ameliorate 
than other inequalities. Measures can be taken to restrict educational advantage and 
tax those with high incomes, but enhancements could lead to an underclass, with the 
long-term prospect of two separate species of humans; the gene rich and the gene 
poor. Currently, ‘designing’ babies is in fact limited to choosing from potential babies 
using IVF and embryo selection or prenatal diagnosis and selective termination. There 
are groups opposed both to abortion and to IVF.  
 
From a disability rights perspective the labelling of some conditions as disabilities 
that merit a termination of pregnancy is problematic, as are attempts to ‘normalise’ 
the disabled body. Children with acondroplasia may be subjected to operations to 
lengthen limbs or Down’s children to facial surgery. Available technologies are being 
applied to conditions newly identified as ‘medical’. Children who are below average 
in height have been treated with growth hormone, originally used for children with a 
medically recognised condition, and Ritalin is widely used beyond the identified 
client group. Parents and doctors have argued that short people are disadvantaged in 
life; as are those who find it difficult to concentrate. This illustrates the point that 
enhancements gain their own momentum; the promise of a better life makes it 
difficult to refuse enhancements, particularly when parents are choosing for their 
children. Fukuyama argues that there will be in effect a “genetic arms race” with 
parents forced to ‘choose’ to prevent their child being disadvantaged. As an 
enhancement becomes normal then it is no longer advantageous and so something 
further will be sought. As Hirsch wrote:”If everyone stands on tiptoe, no one sees 
better.”9 Those who oppose genetic human enhancements therefore consider it 
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essential to set limits to enhancement procedures to prevent increased social 
inequality and to protect children from enhancements chosen by their parents. 
Allowing individual choice can lead to societal changes, as seen in countries where 
couples using sex selection to choose boys has led to a skewed sex ratio.  
Other possible risks are the removal of some genetic mutations that have another, 
unknown, potentially useful function and a reduction in genetic diversity. For those 
taking a precautionary line on enhancement the liberal market model is not one that 
should be applied in this area. If techniques are developed without regulation the 
agenda for medicine will be set by commercial interests looking for profit. Medical 
technology and skills will be diverted to unnecessary procedures when treatments that 
would cure disease or restore function are still not available to all. Finally, there is the 
argument that we need to decide on our basic human values and protect them.10 There 
is a danger that biotechnology will cause us to lose our humanity.11 
 
There are others who advocate caution whilst not opposing enhancement in principle. 
They argue that we should consider what a good human life is and look at individual 
needs in relation to other people, since the good life is lived with others.12 Glover 
adopts a compromise position by which parents can make positive choices of 
characteristics but choices are limited by some regulation of options in the public 
interest, including the need to prevent social inequalities.13 The difficulty of drawing 
a line between treatment and enhancement, or ethical and non-ethical uses o




Stock argues that ‘the current discussion about human enhancement …..[is] at a 
fundamental level …about philosophy and religion. It is about what it means to be 
human, about our vision of the human future’.14 The media and public debate on 
enhancement in the UK has mainly been in response to specific cases or to proposed 
changes in regulation. Recent topics have included the increase in requests for 
preimplantation diagnosis for cancers, for stem cell therapies and for licences to 
create hybrid embryos, while a flood of discussion was prompted by regulatory 
changes contained in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008.15 Coverage 
included criticism of proposals that could be seen as tampering with human life, 
stories of patients who might benefit and speculation about possible enhanced futures. 
Whilst there are specific interest groups, including those with a religious affiliation, 
which have strong views on the application of genetic technologies to enhance human 
life,  they may not raise the questions of most interest to those who do not subscribe to 
these groups.  
 
The purpose of this project was to encourage young people aged 10-18 to think about 
the issues involved in human enhancement using real life and science fiction 
examples. The issues raised moved from a general focus on the body and technology 
to the more specific issues of genomics and other convergent technologies. Through 
collecting their responses to imagined and actual scenarios the focus was on the forms 
of argumentation the young people use, the implicit or explicit values and 
assumptions they make and how their reasoning relates to that presented in the 
bioethical literature. For example, do they use standard ethical theories and arguments 
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as found in the literature? Do they see a need to distinguish between treatment and 
enhancement? Do they believe in genetic exceptionalism? In terms of theories do they 
use consequentialist or deontological arguments or apply ethical principles to specific 
cases? Do they prioritise individual choice and/or bring in broader social and political 
factors in their answers?  
 
It is now taken for granted within the UK that some form of public consultation is an 
essential part of developing policy within science and technology. Bodies like the 
HFEA and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics carry out regular public consultations, 
and funding bodies including the Wellcome Trust and the ESRC support diverse 
public engagement activities with specific funding streams. The motivations for 
public engagement are diverse; the hope that it will increase public confidence and 
trust in science, the view that engaging the public is as an essential part of democracy, 
and the contention that the public’s own expertise is of value to scientists and policy 
makers.16 For the public to be involved in the development of research agendas it is 
essential that they are involved ‘upstream’, as the science and technology develops, 
rather than simply when it is ready to be applied, or already applied. There is also a 
need for the results of public engagement to be incorporated into decision-making 
processes.17 Most public engagement is undertaken with adults but there is an 
argument that being ‘upstream’ in the sense of engaging with younger people is 
particularly valuable since they will experience the consequences of decisions being 
made now about research and applications. 
The sample 
The data was collected from three comprehensive schools and one primary school in 
the North West of England. The original intention was to include the top year of 
primary school (age 10/11), first year secondary (age 11/12) and the final years of 
secondary school (age 16/18); however 30 students age 13/14 were also included at 
the request of one school. The schools chosen were non-selective (by academic or 
religious criteria) and included schools in different settings within the same county 
(rural, small town, suburban and urban). All the schools had children from different 
social class backgrounds and one secondary school had significant numbers from non-
white minority ethnic groups. Although the sample was diverse there is no claim that 
the findings are generalisable. The school-based sessions were mainly conducted in 
religious studies classes or personal, social and health education (PSHE), with two 
sessions in ‘A’ level philosophy and one science class (the year 9 students). The year 
9 group were therefore distinctive by subject and age, but for the others there were 
differences in responses by age and gender but not by subject. In all, 225 students 
completed questionnaires (103 male, 121 female, one unknown). Responses were 
analysed using SPSS including the coding of the open-ended questions by themes.  
Methodology 
The research in school was carried out during a normal lesson slot; taking 75 minutes 
in the primary school and 50 minutes in the secondary schools. 35 of the young 
people had the same session as part of an ESRC-funded outreach session at Lancaster 
University in a 75 minute slot. The session divided the stimulus material into sections, 
coherent with the questionnaire. PowerPoint was used to introduce examples for 
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discussion and included film clips from Robots and Bicentennial Man (all groups); 
and The Island (16-18 year olds only).18 The film clips had to be age appropriate and 
accessible while introducing and conveying a clear point of moral decision making 
with regard to how we consider our bodies. Robots was used to stimulate thinking 
about the possibility of ‘upgrades’ for humans. Bicenntenial Man showed a robot 
gradually acquiring human characteristics and raised the question if or when a part-
technological being became human and whether people should be free to choose what 
enhancements they want. Older children were shown an additional clip from The 
Island to help them think about the use of technologies to solve problems, whether it 
matters what methods are used and to consider again whether treatment and 
enhancement can and/or should be distinguished. Students were given a questionnaire 
with summaries of the main points made in each section and questions to debate in 
groups. They were asked to record their personal responses through drawing and/or 
writing and were encouraged to give reasons for their answers.  
 
The worksheet/questionnaires were the same for all ages except for the two additional 
questions for the 16-18 year old students based on the movie clip from The Island, 
which probed students’ ideas about the issue of a treatment-enhancement distinction. 
The PowerPoint assisted in methodically introducing each group of questions, 
breaking the overall task down into manageable sections and allowing for changes in 
the pace and style of engagement. This approach supported student engagement, 
individually and in groups. 
 
Section 1 asked for students’ own ideas for ‘upgrading’ humans, starting with a clip 
from the film Robots in which robots are exhorted to ‘upgrade’. Follow-up questions 
asked whether they thought other people would want ‘upgrades’ and whether people 
should be able to choose. By using cartoon about robots rather than human beings this 
clip did not suggest enhancements directly applicable to humans but left it open to the 
young people to come up with their own ideas. Section 2 considered the case of 
Paralympic gold medal winner Oscar Pistorius, who has Flex-Foot Cheetah® 
prosthetic legs and had hoped to compete in the Beijing Olympic Games. Although 
Pistorius’s technology is biomechanical rather than genetic, it engenders the same 
type of basic moral questions and reasoning that would be encountered in decisions 
about genetic enhancements. Older students (16-18) were specifically asked whether a 
distinction can be made between treatment and enhancement. Section 3 looked at 
whether students distinguished between different methods of human enhancement, 
genetic and non-genetic.  
 
The final section was about students’ ideas on regulation in this field and whether any 
regulation is needed.  
Section 1: ‘If we could ‘upgrade’ humans, what ‘upgrades’ would you want, if 
any? 
All sessions started with a clip from the film Robots, in which robots are exhorted to 
‘upgrade’. “Why be you, when you can be new!”19 The most popular enhancement 
among younger children was being able to fly and, among younger boys to have metal 
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prostheses or to be invincible. Older students were more likely to choose 
enhancements of physical appearance and mental abilities. Overall, however,  
18 per cent of all boys and a quarter of girls did not even want to imagine any 
enhancements because they saw them as unnatural, immoral or simply unnecessary. 
Typical responses from a younger and older boy respectively were; 
 
I don’t want any upgrades because it [is] imorle (immoral) to 
change who you are. You are born and your special, if you 
‘upgrade’ humans everyone would want the same thing, it’s stupid 
(boy, age 11/12) 
 
In terms of upgrades that enhance beyond human capacities I would 
not require any upgrades. The search for perfection is created by a 
desire to be ‘better’. This can never be fulfilled in a sense. What is 
important is to be content with ones current situation.  
(boy, age 17/18) 
 
Whether or not students wanted enhancements themselves, they expected other people 
to want them and thought they should be allowed to choose. A selection of the 11-12 
year olds’ responses show the priorities young people expect others to have, concerns 
about appearance linked to avoidance of bullying or lack of friends and the worries 
about getting old, perhaps expressed by their parents. 
 
I think that most people would want an upgrade to help them lose 
weight or change the way they look  
Don’t get bags and wrinkles on your face  
To be liked and involved, and also to be better looking, because 
people can feel left out and ugly compared to people around them. 
Taller or smaller anything they’re not happy with really  
(Year 7 students)  
Section 2: Oscar Pistorius: the Paralympian 
Oscar Pistorius is an athlete born with no lower limbs who uses two Cheetah® Flex-
Feet®. 20 However, both disabled and able-bodied athletes have argued that the Flex-
Feet give Pistorius an advantage, as the blades he uses are longer than are necessary, 
allowing him to cover more ground in each stride and making him taller than he 
would have been if he had been born with legs. Having discussed whether Pistorius 
had been treated for a disability or enhanced beyond his abilities, the students were 
asked to consider the case of a single-limbed Paralympian who wished to have a 
healthy limb amputated and replaced with blades to gain a similar advantage and a 
short able-bodied athlete who wanted a double amputation to give an increased stride. 
Although Pistorius had a non-genetic treatment-enhancement, it was used as a real life 
example raising questions of risk, harm, fairness and choice.  
 
Here a student articulates Hirsch’s remark: ‘if everyone stands on tiptoe, no one sees 
better’21: 
 
[Replacing 1 leg] I think it is acceptable for this to occur (his human 
foot being replaced with an artificial one). His decision is not 
affecting anybody else therefore why not? However, there are 
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obvious problems. It is like a stack of dominoes. One person will 
follow another. Where will it stop? People may continuously start 
adopting the process for self-satisfaction. Thus, in the long term it is 
wrong. [Replacing 2 legs] No this shouldn’t happen. Being perfectly 
normal is a blessing therefore why should people alter it? Also, 
again in the long run this could cause problems as an increasing 
number of people want to do the same. (Female, age 17/18) 
 
As noted earlier, Frank talks of our right to reshape our bodies to improve our life 
chances and realise our ambitions.22 However, as the student above has written, the 
uncoerced choices of numerous individuals can in time constitute a socially accepted 
and expected trend.23  
 
Several points were picked up by most students regardless of their age, gender or 
subject group. They acknowledged that a single-limbed disabled athlete might wish to 
amputate a leg, even if they saw such a choice as selfish, unnatural and unnecessary, 
but some felt this choice should not be allowed. In contrast most students saw the 
short athlete’s choice to amputate both healthy legs as ridiculous, selfish, unnatural or 
unnecessary and something that should not be allowed. In a similar way the public 
have expressed disgust at self-demand amputation for those with body dysmorphic 
disorder. As Bayne and Levy have noted: “The desire for amputation of a healthy 
limb is at odds with current conceptions of the ideal body image. The preference for 
bodily integrity is deep-seated in normal human beings, and advertising does much to 
reinforce such norms. We therefore think it unlikely that the desire for amputation 
will proliferate”. 24 
 
People will be afended [offended] by someone cutting off a healthy 
leg for an artificial one, and people with no legs will become 
afended (male, age 13/14) 
[double amputation] I think its sick because his normal feet are fine. 
(male, age 11/12) 
I think its bad because s/he is cutting both s/he’s legs and your 
disabling yourself. (male, age 13/14) 
 
Secondary issues included the consequences of making such choices and the harm or 
regret this might engender, as there would be no going back.  
 
The short, able-bodied athlete should stick with what he has 
otherwise it would open the floodgates for everyone else to chop 
their legs off. I think it would also outrage people who have no legs 
as people are wasting their legs. What would he do when he is not in 
the Olympics any more? (Female, age 13/14) 
 
In regard to Pistorius the general consensus was that he is disabled and having 
artificial legs is a treatment. But his ability to extend his prosthetics beyond the given 
parameters one would allometrically expect for his body was an enhancement. A 
common comment on the distinction, in this case from a girl aged 13 or 14, was 
between ‘having a problem solved’ and bring ‘given something that is ‘better than 
normal’ echoing Carl Elliot’s distinction in Better Than Well.25 
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If someone is being treated they are having things that they need to 
be [done]. Where as if you have an enhancement you are having 
things made ‘better’ than normal. (Year 12 female) 
 
For Harris and others an enhancement is “good for you” and “by definition an 
improvement on what went before” 26 However, some students employed this 
definition pejoratively arguing that: 
 
 An enhancement improves by adding something that’s not needed. A 
treatment improves by treating a problem and replenishing it back to 
its natural state. No enhancement should be needed otherwise 
human rules aren’t clear. (Male, age 17/18) 
 
Others hinted at the reasons that make the treatment-enhancement distinction 
problematic including changes in perception and classification;  
 
We need to distinguish between what is classed as a method for 
medical difficulty and methods of enhancement. However, it would 
prove very difficult to do. In a way we choose what treatment we 
want and not want. (Female, age 16/17) 
 
Many of those who struck a note of caution when it comes to the slippery slope 
between treatment and enhancement suggested we should take a precautionary case-
by-case approach, at least in the first instance.  
 
It depends on the circumstances: In some cases there are elements of 
both e.g. if you had a brace it would not only make you look better 
(enhancement) but it would treat them in the process. However if 
someone had upgrades they may use them for the wrong reasons. 
It’s up to the person who wants it done. If it’s their individual 
decision then they should go by that. It’s a need and want situation. 
However, the doctor will know your medical and physical state. 
They would need to advise you. (Female, age 13/14) 
 
Yes we do need to make a distinction. To do this though we can’t 
make absolute rules, each case would have to be analysed on its own 
individual merits. (Male, age 17/18) 
Section 3: Does it matter how human enhancement is achieved? 
The facilitator introduced the topic by saying to the group: “So does it matter how we 
enhance or treat people, what methods we use? Let’s try what is called a hypothetical 
question here.  I’m going to give you a situation that could happen but hasn’t 
happened yet, and I want you to imagine your response to it.” Students were asked to 
give their preferences between different imaginary ways of reducing human 
aggression using the following wording.  
 
Imagine a world with a global government. If we were all to agree 
that making the human race less aggressive was a ‘good thing’ 
would it matter how we did this? Which method would you choose 
and why? 
 
© ESRC Genomics Network. www.gspjournal.com 
 
14      Genomics, Society and Policy 
             2010, Vol.6, No.1 pp.1-15 
 
_____________    
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.6, No.1 (2010) ISSN: 1746-5354 
9
The alternatives offered were: 
[To] genetically modify all humans (before birth) to be less aggressive. 
[To] modify all humans, by putting a chemical into the world’s water supply that 
would reduce aggressive tendencies by a fixed amount forever, as soon as that 
chemical reaches the brain. 
or [to] provide drugs to the world’s population (by post) that would reduce aggressive 
tendencies, but only if taken twice a day.27 
 
The expectation we had, which was fulfilled, was that the genetic modification would 
be the least popular of the options and the non-genetic, non-permanent enhancement 
would be the most popular. However, the most popular choice of all was to reject all 
options. The question provoked discussions regarding free will and the freedom to act, 
drawing in concomitant political issues. The idea of a global consensus that would 
lead to a blanket policy regarding a bodily enhancement was seen as an infringement 
of freedom of choice and untenable in terms of implementation. Amongst the 
secondary students, this provoked discussion of the World Health Organisation’s 
global vaccination programs, and the issue of parental choice. 
 
I think in some cases people ought to be forced to comply e.g. 
vaccination. But generally speaking each person ought to be able to 
choose and each case ought to be judged and treated separately, and 
the outcome ought to be dependent on necessity. (Female, age 16/17) 
 
Around half of the older students (aged 16-18), and at least 18 per cent in all groups, 
refused to choose any of the options. This was a definite choice as they had not been 
presented with ‘none of these’ or ‘don’t know’ as an option.  
 
I don’t want to choose any of them because it is so unnatural. I just 
want to live life without ID cards or chips in me or drugs to calm me 
down! Just leave me alone! Just accept what humans are!!!  
(Female, age 11/12) 
 
Other reasons for rejecting any option were that ‘altering people en masse’ is 
dangerous, removes choice and is totalitarian, and, that aggressiveness is not always a 
bad thing. Another group wrote that they were reluctant or did not want to choose but 
‘if I had to choose’ went on to opt for the non-permanent, non-genetic option. For this 
group, taking pills twice a day at least allowed choice.  
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Genetic & permanent Non-genetic & permanent Drug & non-permanent None of these
Choice of method (%) 
Global enhancement to reduce aggression
 
To be honest I would prefer not to choose any of the options and 
believe that humans as individuals should be valued and given free 
will and the responsibility to make a decision for themselves. Thus if 
I had to choose one on principle it would be option C (non-drug 
non-permanent], although I tend to think that those more angled 
towards aggression would not take the tablets and thus this would 
not have been very effective. I think that to an extent we should not 
want to have everyone completely non-aggressive because I think it 
could turn to critical consequences with us all turning into robots. 
(Female, age 17/18) 
 
Some suggested alternative social measures to reduce aggression: 
  
I would not choose any of the above as they are all methods that 
lead to further control by governments and a restriction of our 
freedom. Surely it is always better to try and reduce aggression by 
talking, teaching and learning because in the end this is always 
going to be more ethically correct than filling someone full of drugs. 
(Male, age 16/17) 
 
Three main features emerged; firstly, a major reaction against the idea of losing one’s 
freedom to choose how to act on a daily basis to a global power. Secondly, the 
enhancement of one’s mental faculties seems to have struck a different chord from 
that of bodily enhancement. Although not explicitly stated, there seemed to be a sense 
in which aggression and the ability to express that aggression was linked with the 
ability to act upon and express one’s autonomy; as in responding to a totalitarian 
system. 
 
In my opinion I wouldn’t vote [for] any – and hope no other would. 
– but if I had to choose one (which we would in this increasingly 
restrictive society _ and lack of freedom) it would be c) as it would 
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give me choice not to take the drug because – emotions are what 
makes us human take this away and we are mindless zombies 
without even realising it. – This is not enhancement – this is 
suppression. (Male, age 17/18, his emphasis) 
 
Genetic modification came across as less acceptable than using chemicals in the water 
only due to the difficulties associated with its implementation; being seen as ‘less 
natural’. But for those few who were pro-genetic enhancement it was seen as more 
effective in the long-term. 
 
Older students were shown two movie clips from The Island and asked to consider 
whether we need to choose between methods that are allowed for treating a medical 
problem and methods allowed for enhancement. 
Individual choice, autonomy and regulation 
Having strongly asserted the individual’s right to choose and overwhelmingly rejected 
any so-called enhancement being imposed, students were then asked whether there 
was a need for any regulation. A clear rejection of forced, and sometimes concealed, 
enhancement did not mean that there was widespread support for a complete freedom 
to choose. Like the bioethicists Savulescu and McGee, some did simply accept that 
we should trust people to choose but more commonly students thought about the 
context of individual choice and the cumulative effects of such choices: 
 
Yes, [we need guidelines] because the need for resources and 
technicians for strictly medical treatment is being taken up by 
consumerist cosmetic surgery industry. (Male, age 17/18 ) 
 
Yes, [we need guidelines] but you should be allowed if you NEED 
THEM. It shouldn’t be a matter of free will otherwise people with 
lots of money shall be more and more artificial. (Male, age 16/17) 
 
Another common concern that emerged across the groups was the perceived threat to 
what makes us human and our human values, echoing Habermas (2003) and 
Fukuyama (2002).  
 
Obviously this will lead to a lot of debate but I think yes, there must 
be guidelines to prevent too - extreme – a change as this could lead 
to purely artificial people we can no longer call human.  
(Female, age 16/17) 
 
Yes we do [need guidelines] otherwise what is stopping us from 
becoming man-made robots with the ability of altering ourselves 
however we choose to and wish to. Providing someone with medical 
care in order for them to live a normal life has justification however 
enhancement are just abusing our abilities to do so.  
(Female, age 17/18) 
 
Asked who should be consulted in the process of making regulation ‘the public’, ‘the 
public including children’ and ‘experts’ were equally and most frequently chosen.  
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Conclusion 
Our key findings suggest that most students were happy to imagine ‘upgrades’ but 
more likely to question the practice of enhancement in real life. The minority who 
declined even to imagine enhancements generally maintained this viewpoint 
throughout the debate. The majority who were initially pro-enhancement began to 
question their position, while the minority who were unclear at the start moved toward 
an anti-enhancement position. This may have been due to taking part in the session 
and discussion. Cobb and Hamlett’s report on the 2008 National Citizens’ Forum on 
Human Enhancement in the USA, found that following a deliberative forum panellists 
“became more worried and cautious about the prospective benefits of the human 
enhancement technologies”.28  
 
The issues of naturalness and necessity were prevalent, with little differentiation by 
gender. Students could desire enhancement ‘imaginatively’, but they also valued the 
naturalness of their given bodies, with all the concomitant uncertainties and 
fallibilities this engenders. They would fiercely defend the right for the majority of 
society to have access to the possibility of enhancements, with the significant caveat 
that this will be done fairly and be well regulated and carry the responsibilities 
concomitant with such rights. But they would also ameliorate such freedoms with 
discussion of ‘necessity’, for individuals and society.  
 
The young people did not have the space of a book or journal article to develop their 
views, unlike bioethicists, so their responses were more comparable with the public 
output of experts in the media. The young people were less certain and less decided 
than the experts, not necessarily because they were less knowledgeable but sometimes 
because they took broader considerations into account. In the arguments for 
enhancement they asserted individual freedom of choice most strongly and none 
mentioned a moral or ethical duty to enhance and to improve on nature. However, 
they also argued that individuals had to bear the responsibilities for choices they had 
made. The difference in context is that the young people were thinking about choices 
people can make for themselves, since we did not focus on enhancement through 
reproductive choices. This removed the moral issues raised by genetic testing and 
termination of pregnancy or selection and discarding of embryos, making the topic 
more acceptable to the schools, especially the primary school involved. Given the 
respondents’ stress on individuals making responsible choices it is unlikely that they 
would have fully supported the view that parents should be free to choose for their 
children.  
 
The dominant framework for considering what people should do was not a utilitarian 
one in the sense employed by prominent bioethicists including Harris and Savulescu. 
Following a discussion of a deaf lesbian couple seeking to ‘deliberately create’ a deaf 
child Savulescu concludes that; 
 
Increasingly people will seek to use medicine to improve their lives 
in ways that others may disagree with. And some of these 
improvements will not be in terms of prevention or treatment of 
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disease, but in the achievement of other goods in life... As rational 
people we should all form our ideas about what is the best life.29  
 
For the young people the freedom to choose was important but there was a 
responsibility to take into account what would happen if everyone freely made their 
own choices. In other words, they implicitly employed the Kantian maxim that the 
individual ”act only in such a way that you can will that the maxim of your action 
should become a universal law”. Some enhancements would no longer be 
enhancements if everyone chose them, for example, if IQ could be enhanced then 
having a high IQ that meets the criteria for joining Mensa could become 
commonplace and such a child would no longer be considered ‘gifted’. Where people 
did not consider ‘what would happen if everyone did that’ then there was a 
justification for constraining them, limiting choices, introducing regulation in order to 
protect other people. In Onora O’Neill’s account of principled autonomy that 
“requires we act only on principles that can be principles for all”, the moral principles 
that can be derived from it require the “rejection of injury, of coercion, of slavery, of 
indifference” to others and the rejection of deception.30 The young people particularly 
emphasised the importance of considering other people, extended to a concern to 
protect what it is to be human. They constrained choice where it might harm others, 
destroy or change the human race or destroy what humans value. They did not expect 
people necessarily to think beyond themselves and their immediate wishes. Therefore, 
while ‘generally speaking people should be free to choose’ there was an imperative to 
intervene where individual choices would have societal repercussions.  
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